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Why Financial Intermediaries Buy Put Options from 
Companies 
Abstract  
In the 90s, firms collected billions of dollars from the sale of put options written 
on their own stock. We formulate two hypotheses about the motivation of financial 
intermediaries to purchase such options from the issuing companies. The first hypothesis 
states that the intermediaries intend to exploit executive overoptimism by offering to buy 
put options at lower premium. Under the other hypothesis, which we develop in a 
theoretical model, the intermediaries agree to trade with companies with superior 
information and willingly lose on such trades. Because these trades are not publicly 
disclosed, the financial intermediaries gain valuable information about the future 
performance of the put issuers and can earn profits on this information. We document in a 
sample of 53 firms that have sold put options on their own stock that the vast majority of 
issued put options expire without being exercised. The sample firms experience large 
positive abnormal stock and operating performance after the put option sale. These 
results suggest that the buyers of these options, most of which are financial 
intermediaries, lose money, which contradicts the executive overconfidence hypothesis 
and is consistent with our theoretical explanation that financial intermediaries gain non-
public information in these deals. Based on our analysis we conclude that current lack of 
disclosure of put option trades by companies may allow them together with financial 
intermediaries to earn profits by informed trading. 
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1. Introduction 
In February 1991, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a ruling 
in favor of a request submitted by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) that 
effectively allowed publicly-traded firms to sell put options written on their own stock.  
One of the first companies to do so was IBM, which subsequently realized profits in 1992 
of more than two million dollars from its put option sales (University of Virginia, Darden 
Case Study UVA- F-1009). The IBM example was followed on a much larger scale by 
companies like Microsoft.  Microsoft, over a seven-year period, beginning in 1993, 
received over two billion dollars in total premiums from sales of puts including $766 
million in 1999 alone. Premiums from issuer-sold puts are treated as adjustments to 
retained earnings and are tax exempt.  In almost all cases, the premiums are used by firms 
to repurchase shares in an ongoing stock repurchase program.   
Although the original spirit of SEC ruling was to allow companies to issue put 
options publicly on an organized exchange like the CBOE, most issuers place their 
options privately with financial intermediaries such as investment banks and other 
qualified institutional buyers.  Selling puts directly to financial institutions avoids the 
limitations set by CBOE on the maximum number of outstanding contracts allowed for 
issuing firms.  Moreover, it is not uncommon for institutional investors to broach the firm 
with their interest in purchasing put options that the firm is willing to write. Strictly 
speaking, the transaction is a zero-sum game in which the two parties bet on the direction 
and magnitude of future stock price changes.  And the outcomes appear strongly skewed 
in favor of the issuing firms, as almost all firm-written put options we examine have 
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expired out of the money.  Therefore, it begs the question of why financial intermediaries 
are willingly participating in these transactions and even solicit them. 
In this paper, we investigate the merits of two possible explanations. The first 
explanation argues that financial intermediaries are more sophisticated in pricing illiquid 
options than company managers.  Corporate decisions can be influenced by executive 
overconfidence (Heaton (2002), Malmendier and Tate (2004)).  Managers are more likely 
to sell put options when they are confident about the firm’s future performance.  
Accordingly, intermediaries exploit any over-confidence company executives have for 
the future prospects of their firms and expect to make money on the firm’s put options by 
winning the bet on the future stock price. 
The second explanation posits that company managers possess private 
information regarding the future prospects of their companies and will sell put options 
only when they have favorable information.  Therefore, sophisticated investors know that 
investing in the firm’s put options is a losing proposition.  Nevertheless, the willingness 
of managers to sell put options communicates private information, which a financial 
intermediary can exploit in the market if given a window of opportunity.  Therefore, the 
firm’s put options are initiated and transacted in private and not immediately announced 
to other market participants.  The option premium tendered to the firm implicitly buys the 
intermediary the needed window of opportunity. 
We test which of the two explanations better describes the motivation of financial 
intermediaries to purchase put options using a sample of 53 firms that sold put options on 
their own stock in the period from 1994 to 1999. Based on our empirical analysis we 
reject the executive overconfidence hypotheses. Our evidence suggests that financial 
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intermediaries knowingly lose money in put option deals in order to gain information 
about firm prospects and trade profitably on it.  
Our results indicate that the lack of disclosure that is currently allowed by the 
U.S. regulations could allow not only companies, but also financial intermediaries to 
profit from trading in company issued derivatives at the expense of the broad market 
participants. In the spirit of recent trends to improve company disclosure, one easy 
solution to the incentive problem for financial intermediaries is to mandate full and 
immediate disclosure of all put option trades done by companies. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The theoretical explanations 
why financial intermediaries participate in such deals are outlined in Section 2. Section 3 
describes our sample and provides summary statistics. The results from empirical tests 
are in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Financial Intermediaries and Firm Written Put Options 
 The Chicago Board of Options Exchange was one of the main proponents of 
allowing companies to write put options on organized exchanges. Discussions between 
CBOE and SEC resulted in the commission issuing a ‘no action’ letter in February 1991, 
which allowed companies to sell put options under certain conditions.  The SEC was 
originally reluctant to allow such practice because it was concerned that firms could take 
advantage of their private information by selling puts only when they expect superior 
future performance.  In order to reduce opportunities for informed trading, the SEC 
mandated that all put options should be issued out of the money.  The CBOE also added 
several other constraints to reduce the impact of option issuance on market liquidity. A 
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company could not have more than 8,000 contracts (representing 800,000 shares) open at 
any given time on the CBOE.  
Following the SEC ruling, IBM pioneered the use of issuer written put options in 
stock repurchase programs and later sold the concept and software to implement it to 
other firms and investment banks.  Several investment banks started to actively solicit 
firms and purchase put options from them.  Paul Mazzilli, a principal in equity capital 
markets at Morgan Stanley & Co., is cited to say that "A large portion of the companies 
that do [share repurchase] programs with us have been introduced to it, and use the 
strategy from time to time.” Tyler Dickson, a VP in equity capital markets at Salomon 
Brothers noted that: "This year [1994], put warrants have come of age," and also that: 
"Companies are much more familiar with them as an enhancing vehicle to share 
repurchases."  He added that Salomon has purchased put warrants from three Fortune 500 
companies in the last two weeks alone.1 
In discussion below, we examine theoretical explanations as to why financial 
intermediaries promote the issuance of put options by firms and, in most cases, willingly 
serve as the opposite party to the put option trade. 
2.1. Information Signaling 
Gibson and Singh (2000) propose a theoretical model that analyses the use of put 
options by firms.  In their model, firms that need to raise new capital use put options to 
signal their quality and thereby reduce their financing costs by fetching a better price for 
their newly offered securities. The model is not applicable to the option issuing firms that 
                                                 
1 All quotes are cited in Pratt (1994) 
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we have examined on a number of points.  We find that almost all firms issue puts in 
conjunction with stock repurchase programs and are clearly not in need of new capital.   
The Gibson and Singh model is a signaling model, and, therefore, the firms make 
the initiating move. However, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that financial 
intermediaries, such as investment banks, initiate the transactions by contacting firms 
with ongoing stock buybacks and offering to purchase put options from them that will 
“enhance” their stock repurchases.  Lastly, most firm written put options are privately 
placed with financial intermediaries and are rarely publicly announced at the time of 
issue.  Market participants are commonly informed of the issue months later in the firm’s 
10K and 10Q reports; therefore, they cannot be intended as timely signals. 
But, more fundamentally, the model does not explain why sophisticated investors 
like financial intermediaries would purchase put options written by the firm on its own 
stock.  Therefore, we do not pursue this explanation further. 
2.2. Information Screening 
 Several papers like Seyhun (1986) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) show that 
managers have superior information about their company future stock return and 
operating performance There is also some evidence provided by studies like Brown, 
Crabb, and Haushalter (2003) that companies can be successful at selective hedging, 
which suggests that companies may have better information that other participants in 
derivative trades. We develop a theoretical model that can explain why financial 
intermediaries willingly participate in such deals even when the issuer firms have 
superior information about their future stock performance that will lead to negative 
expected profits for the buyer of put options.  
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Our model is similar to the screening models used in the insurance, banking and 
industrial organization literature where an uninformed firm proposes different contracts 
to various types of informed customers and, by their choice of optimal contracts, 
manages to separate the customers based on their type.2  In our case, uninformed 
financial intermediaries offer to buy long-term put options from corporations.  By setting 
optimally the premium of the options, the intermediaries learn which corporations have 
positive and which corporations have negative private information about their future 
prospects. Later, based on this information the intermediaries can take long positions in 
publicly traded put options written on the stock of the companies with bad prospects, or 
take short positions in put options and long positions in call options written on the stocks 
of companies with good prospects. 
In order to implement this scheme, the financial intermediaries use a surprisingly 
simple strategy.  The only thing that they need to do is offer a put option premium to the 
issuing corporations that is equal to the fair premium computed using public information.  
As a consequence, only companies that have positive private information about the 
distribution of their future stock price will agree to sell the put options. The companies 
with bad prospects will refuse to participate in the trade because it has negative expected 
value for them. This assures the existence and uniqueness of the separating equilibrium. 
Note that through this screening scheme the financial intermediaries have acquired 
private information in a perfectly legal way. The details of the model are included in the 
Appendix. 
                                                 
2 See for example the pioneering works of Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) 
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For the financial intermediary to practically exploit the acquired information, 
knowledge of the transaction must be kept from other market participants for a time.  As 
most puts purchased by financial intermediaries are privately placed, unlike puts 
purchased on exchanges, the transactions are unobservable by outside parties.  It is 
important to note that the SEC does not mandate that put option sales be publicly 
announced at the time of issue.  Moreover, the SEC has decided that if the put option sale 
affects the financial situation of the firm in a non-material way, there is no legal 
requirement to disclose it.  This implies that, potentially, some firms can choose not to 
disclose their put option trades at all.  We find that many firms disclose their private 
placements of puts on the next 10-Q or 10-K statement, but a large subset of the firms in 
our sample report their put option trades much later.  On average, for the firms we 
examine, the time from the date of the trade to the date that it is disclosed to the public is 
more than six months 
In many cases, the financial intermediaries suggest that companies sell non-
standard put option contracts. The options are often European and with longer maturities 
than one year. Even more strikingly most put options allow the issuer to settle them at 
any time before expiration.  Such option to settle given to the option writer is unique.  
However, it can be desirable in an informational sense to the purchasing financial 
intermediary.  Not only can the writing firms issue puts when they have positive 
information, but they can settle them before expiration when they have subsequent 
negative information about future prospects.  In both cases, the purchasing financial 
intermediary loses on the puts, but gains information that the market does not have. 
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Based on the model we formulate our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Screening by financial intermediaries 
Only managers with superior and positive information about their company future 
performance will agree to sell options to financial intermediaries. These options will 
generate positive profits for the issuing companies and losses for the buyers. Financial 
intermediaries agree to purchase these options because they gain valuable information 
about company performance that can generate profits in other trades. 
2.3. Executive Overconfidence 
We also consider an explanation that posits that financial intermediaries expect to 
profit from their purchases of put options from issuing firms. This explanation is based 
on potential executive overconfidence as in the pioneering paper by Roll (1986) and 
recent work by Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2004). Drawing on studies in 
the psychology literature, Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2004) argue that 
CEO’s are particularly likely to display overconfidence for three reasons: individuals 
overestimate the likelihood of good outcomes in outcomes they believe are under their 
control (Weinstein, 1980); individuals are overconfident about outcomes to which they 
are highly committed (Weinstein 1980); overconfidence is most likely when the reference 
point is abstract (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, et. al., 1982).  The models show 
that optimistic managers overestimate the NPV of the projects they invest in while they 
also believe that capital markets undervalue their firm. Malmendier and Tate (2004) then 
document that many company CEOs show significant overconfidence about their 
company performance and such overconfidence results in overinvestment and suboptimal 
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personal portfolio decisions and significantly affects the correlation between corporate 
investment and cash flow. 
Financial institutions may exploit the habitual overconfidence of company 
executives regarding the future stock performance of their firms.  Based on the above 
arguments, executives are likely to be overconfident about the firm’s future stock price 
because the price is the result of outcomes under their control, it represents a target to 
which they are committed, and it is an abstract reference point.  Financial intermediaries 
can offer to buy put options at lower premia and expect that executives will agree to the 
deal because they underestimate the probability of the options to be in the money.  
Based on this analysis we can formulate our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Managerial overconfidence 
Overconfident (overoptimistic) managers may agree to sell put options at lower 
prices to financial intermediaries. These options will generate positive expected profits 
for the buyers and negative profits for the issuing companies 
2.4. Testable Predictions  
 The two hypotheses why financial intermediaries participate in put option trades 
have very different implications about the expected profits for both parties in the trade. In 
the case of executive overconfidence, financial intermediaries should on average make 
profits from the put options and respectively companies will lose money. On the other 
hand, if managers have superior information, then companies will on average generate 
profits at the expense of financial intermediaries.  
The disclosed information in the annual reports does not allow us to measure the 
exact financial outcome of the put option trades, except for in a couple of isolated cases 
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like Microsoft. But, we can measure the abnormal performance of the companies after the 
issuances of put options. If companies outperformed in risk or peer-adjusted terms, then it 
is likely that managers had superior information that was not publicly available at the 
time of the trade. Conversely, poor abnormal performance signifies that managers were 
overconfident and the financial intermediaries took advantage of their bias. This 
discussion suggests that the main empirical tests that could distinguish between the two 
explanations is to compute measures of abnormal performance after companies sell put 
options.  
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
We identify firms that sold put options on their own stock over the period from 
January 1992 through December 1999 by searching 10-K and 10-Q statements available 
on the Lexis-Nexis® database for the whole period and on the SEC EDGAR filings 
database from January 1994 through December 1999.  We search for the following 
phrases: “put derivative,” “put option,” “equity put,” “put feature,” “stock put,” “put 
provision,” “put the shares,” “Sale of put,” “sold put,” “put sold” or “rights to put.” We 
find 383 firms that include one of the key words in at least one of their financial reports. 
Of these we drop firms that sell put options on foreign exchange, interest rate, or debt 
securities. We are left with 53 firms that used their own stock as the underlying asset in 
the issue of put derivatives, most in connection with a stock repurchase program. These 
53 firms came from 34 industries as indicated by their four-digit SIC codes.  Most of 
these firms issued put options in conjunction with ongoing stock buybacks. 
Only nine of the 53 firms report the exact date on which they have sold put 
options for the first time. In order to find the date in the remaining cases, we look through 
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all 10-K and 10-Q statements for references of option expiration. Based on these 
references, we are able to infer an exact date for an additional eight firms. Similarly, 11 
firms report he month when they sold put options, and we infer the month for an 
additional 16 firms. Four firms report only the quarter, while the remaining five firms 
report only the year when they first issued put options.  
In order to measure abnormal performance, we examine the financial profiles and 
stock returns of the 53 firms in our sample in comparison with two sets of industry/size 
matched control firms. The first control set consists of firms with plain-vanilla stock 
repurchase programs because most of the put option issuers have also ongoing repurchase 
programs. Firms with ongoing share repurchase programs are identified using SDC 
Platinum. Firms without stock repurchase programs comprise the second set.  
For each of the 53 firms in our sample, using COMPUSTAT, we construct a list 
of firms having the same 4-digit SIC code.  Then, we find the three firms with plain-
vanilla repurchase programs within the 4-digit SIC group closest in size to the sample 
firm.3 Likewise, we also find the three closest in size firms that have no repurchase 
programs.  This procedure gives a control set consisting of 122 industry-and-size-
matched firms that have ongoing stock repurchase programs and another control set with 
122 industry-and-size-matched firms with no stock repurchase programs.4  
                                                 
3 The market value of equity, our measure of firm size, is calculated using data obtained from CRSP for the 
end of the quarter before the sample firms sell put options on their own stock. 
4 The number of control firms is less than 159 because several of the synthetic repurchase firms share  
matched firms in common as they fall in the same 4-digit SIC industry and are very similar in size. 
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In Table 1, we report several summary statistics for the put options issued by our 
sample firms. The majority of companies, 32 of 53, issued European-style put options; 
only 11 issued American-style. As only American-style options can be traded on the 
CBOE, it seems that very few of the companies intend to place their put options publicly. 
This is directly confirmed by looking at the second column of Table 1 in which we report 
the type of buyers disclosed in the financial statements. Only one company discloses that 
it placed the put options publicly on an exchange. The rest have placed their options with 
private counter-parties. In most cases the identity of the buyer is not disclosed, and when 
it is disclosed it is either an investment bank, or another institutional investor. More than 
40% of the companies that disclose the maturity of the options issue long-term put 
options with maturities greater or equal to one year. 
We include descriptive statistics of the time till disclosure in the fourth column of 
Table 1. The median time from the date of the option sale to the date it is disclosed in the 
company financial statements is 99 days, while the average is 186 days. Only one 
company announced its intent to sell put options in advance of the deal. The maximum in 
our sample is a staggering 1561 days, or more than four years, after the deal had been 
transacted.  
Last, we report the extent to which the options were exercised or expired.  Most 
of the options expire out of the money. In only two cases companies state that all options 
were exercised, while in 32 cases all options expired out of the money. In additional six 
cases the issuers took advantage of the early settlement option, and in eight cases it is 
stated that some options are exercised and some expire.   
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4. Empirical Results  
The summary description of the sample show that, in almost all cases, firms sell 
put options directly to buyers, the transactions are made known to the public only after a 
long time interval, and most options expire out of the money.  Collectively these findings 
are consistent with information screening by financial intermediaries.  In this section, we 
examine changes in operating performance for issuing firms as compared to that for 
benchmark firms.  We also examine abnormal stock price performance following the 
issuance of put options. 
4.1. Accounting performance 
Table 2 reports mean earnings before interest & taxes (EBIT) for the issuing firms 
and the two sets of benchmark firms. Year 0 is defined as the year in which the issuing 
firms begin selling puts.  We calculate the mean EBIT for each year over an 11-year 
period centered on Year 0.  We test the statistical significance of the difference in means 
between the sets of firms.  For each set, we also test the difference between the mean 
EBIT reported for Year –5 and Year 0 and between Year 0 and Year 5. 
As shown in Table 2, the differences in the means of earnings between put issuing 
firms and plain-vanilla repurchase firms are not significantly different at the 0.05 level 
for the years preceding Year 0.  However, the sample firms report significantly higher 
earnings following the initial put sale.  Increases in earnings between Year –5 and Year 0 
and between Year 0 and Year 5 are statistically significant for the put issuers. They are 
not statistically significant for plain-vanilla repurchase firms or for firms without 
repurchase programs. 
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The results in Table 2 indicate that firms that sell put options are associated with 
increased earnings over time and higher levels of earnings relative to the benchmark 
firms.  These findings are not consistent with the managerial overconfidence hypothesis 
in which firms realized performance falls below management’s overoptimistic 
expectations.  On the contrary, the results support the alternative hypothesis that financial 
intermediaries buy put options to screen for firms with good future performance.  
4.2. Stock performance 
Table 3 reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for those issuing firms with 
an identifiable date for their first put option sale. Even though as shown in Table 1 the put 
option sale is reported after more than six months on average, the CARs for a two or 
three-day window after the date of the sale are about 2%, which are statistically and 
economically significant. Moreover, the CARs for a longer 60-day window are higher 
than 10%. Our findings of positive and large stock performance after the put option sale 
are consistent with both companies expecting superior future performance and financial 
intermediaries trading on this information immediately after the put options sale. Their 
abnormal trading is perhaps incorporated into the stock price and generates the positive 
abnormal returns in the short event windows. 
It is interesting to note the significantly negative performance in the period before 
the put option sale. This result is consistent with Rozeff and Zaman (1998), who 
document that insiders buy shares when their firms that have been significantly 
undervalued by the market. It might be that the firms in our sample time their put option 
sales after a period of temporary negative stock performance. This conjecture is further 
supported by Figure 2 where we plot Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for trading 
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days from –60 to +60 relative to the first put option sale.5 The U-shaped pattern of the 
CAARs is well pronounced, which suggests that the firms successfully time the market 
and issue put options very close to the 120-day low of their stock price.   
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper we investigate the incentives of financial intermediaries to buy put 
options privately from companies, where the underlying security for the put is the 
company stock. We document that after the put option sale the issuing companies 
experience an increase in their earnings compared to two benchmark groups. They also 
have significantly positive abnormal returns of more than 10% after the event. These 
results reject the hypothesis that financial intermediaries purchase put options in order to 
exploit the overconfidence bias of company executives. Our descriptive statistics and 
performance results, together with anecdotal evidence, suggest that on average financial 
intermediaries lose from their option trades, while the issuers make money.  
These findings support an alternative explanation that we develop with a 
theoretical model. We propose that financial intermediaries may willingly participate in 
deals with informed parties even when they expect to lose on these trades. If such trades 
are not disclosed publicly, the financial intermediaries can acquire valuable information 
about the future performance of the companies they trade with and then earn abnormal 
profits on this information at the expense of other market participants.  
Our theoretical model and empirical results call attention to potential problems 
associated with the current regulations governing derivative trades of companies. The 
                                                 
5 We construct Figure 2 similarly to Figure 2 in Schwert (1996) 
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lack of sufficient disclosure of such trades, especially when the opposite parties are 
financial intermediaries or other sophisticated investors, leaves room for such investors to 
earn rents from uninformed traders.  We conclude that one easy to way to protect the rest 
of the market participants is to mandate immediate or even advance disclosure of firm put 
option sales. Only mandatory disclosure will leave no room for earning rents on non-
public information by trading in company-issued puts.  Our conclusion is very much in 
the spirit of recent improvements in company disclosure associated with Regulation FD 
and upholds Fried (2004) who recommends that firms should disclose in advance their 
purchase orders associated with open market stock buybacks.  
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Appendix. A Theoretical Model of Screening by Financial 
Intermediaries through Put Option Trades 
 
Consider one risk neutral financial intermediary denoted by I, and two types of 
firms.6 Type A firms have a positive signal about their future prospects, while type B 
firms have a negative or neutral signal about their future prospects.7  
The order of moves is as follows. At time t = 0, Nature picks firm type A or B. At 
time t = 1, the financial intermediary, I offers each of the firms to buy from them at a pre-
specified premium put options written on the firms’ stock. At time t = 2, based on their 
type and the size of the premium, the firms agree or disagree to sell put options to the 
intermediary. Last, at time t = 3, I infers firm type from the actions of the firms at time t 
= 2, and trades on this legally acquired private information. The extensive form of the 
game between the intermediary I and the two types of firms A and B is shown in Figure 1. 
 At time t = 0, the intermediary has no private information about the future stock 
price of the firms. In other words, I cannot distinguish firm type. At time t = 0, type A 
firms have private information that their stock price will go up. In general, type A firms 
are more optimistic than the other market participants, including the financial 
                                                 
6 The assumption that the firms are facing a single investment bank for that deal is reasonable for two 
reasons. First, there is usually a long-term relationship between the investment bank and the firm. It is 
costly for both of them to build a new relationship. Second, as evident in Table 1 the option contracts are 
privately negotiated with non-standard features like long maturity and European style exercise. These types 
of options are not traded on organized exchanges. 
7 The results of this paper can be easily extended for a continuum of firm types. For expositional simplicity 
we focus only on two firm types. 
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intermediary, about their future performance. Or, the firms know that they are less risky 
than the market expects given the available public information. Type B firms, on the 
other hand, have a private signal that their future price will go down or that they are more 
risky than the market expectations. At time t = 2, if I has proposed the optimal premium 
offer and has ensured the existence of a separating equilibrium, the intermediary infers 
firm type and learns which firms will have a stock increase (or are less risky) and which 
will not.  
The payoffs for the firms from participating in the game are denoted by PA for 
firm A, and PB for firm B, where the following is true: 
( )[ ]ATypeValueemiumP putA =−= |Pr,0max      (1) 
( )[ ]BTypeValueemiumP putB =−= |Pr,0max      (2) 
Both firms will get 0 if they don’t agree to sell put options to the financial intermediary. 
Therefore, the firms will agree to the terms of the financial intermediary only if the 
premium they will get is larger than the value of the put option computed given their 
private information.  
 The payoff for the intermediary is denoted by PI, where the following is true: 
( )[ ] ( )mequilibriuseparatingVEValueEemiumP IputI _|Pr,0min +−=   (3) 
The first term of the financial intermediary payoff is the negative of the payoffs for the 
firms, because the sale of put options is a zero sum game. The nature of the second term 
underlines the main contribution of our model. This is the value of information that I can 
infer about firm type if there is a unique separating equilibrium in the game. If there is a 
pooling equilibrium in the game, the intermediary cannot infer firm type. The second 
term then is equal to 0, and the model reduces to the classical adverse selection model of 
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Akerlof (1970), where the intermediary as an uninformed party will be facing negative 
expected profits from participating in the trade.  The monetary gains VI from acquiring 
private information can potentially be very large. If I knows what firms have a positive 
signal about their future prospects, the intermediary can purchase call options on these 
firms’ stock, sell put options, or buy their stock that is currently undervalued. In Section 
III.C., we illustrate the potential value of private information VI with two numerical 
examples. 
Resulting equilibrium 
 The intermediary will engage in the put option sale only if it assures the existence 
and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium, where firms of type A accept the conditions 
of the sale, and firms of type B reject the contract. If the separating equilibrium exists and 
it is unique, then I acquires private information about firm types and the second term, VI 
in (3) is positive. If the derivatives or stock markets of the firms are liquid enough, the 
value of VI will dominate over the negative adverse selection term, and the intermediary 
will earn positive profits from the transaction. Below we construct a feasible strategy for 
the financial intermediary that ensures a unique separating equilibrium. 
 Let’s assume that the following condition about firm type is true for any  
price > 0: 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫∫ <<
price
B
price
P
price
A dpricepricefdpricepricefdpricepricef
000
   (4) 
Where fA(price) and fB(price) are the probability distribution functions (p.d.f) of the 
prices of firms type A and firms type B,  and fP(price) is the unconditional p.d.f. of the 
price of the average firm, given that the public cannot distinguish firm types. The 
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interpretation of this assumption is that the firms of type A are with better than average 
prospects and it is more likely for them to have higher stock prices in the future than 
firms of type B. The type of the firm is private information. The rest of the market has an 
unconditional cumulative distribution of the future stock price of the average firm that in 
a stochastic sense is dominated by the distribution of the firm type A, and dominates the 
distribution of firm type B. 
 Consider the following strategy for I at time t = 1: 
Propose to every firm that has a highly liquid market in derivatives to buy European-style 
out-of-the money put options with a long maturity for a put premium that is equal to:   
∫ −= Strike P dpricepricefpriceStrikepremiumPut
0
)(*)(_     (5) 
The interpretation of equation (5) is that financial intermediary offers a fair price for the 
put options given the public information that all market participants have about the future 
distribution of stock prices. 
Necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium 
We have to show that the above-proposed strategy of the intermediary leads to a 
unique separating equilibrium. In order for a separating equilibrium to exist and be 
unique, the following sets of individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints 
have to be satisfied for both firm types: 
IR(A): PA ≥ 0 
IR(B): PB ≥ 0 
IC(A): PA ≥ The payoff for a type A firm if it pretends to be a type B firm 
IC(B): PB ≥ The payoff for a type B firm if it pretends to be a type A firm 
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Given the stochastic dominance condition (4), it turns out that: 
A) The individual rationality constraint for firm type A coincides with the incentive 
compatibility constraint for firm type A, and both reduce to the following inequality:  
∫ −≥ Strike A dpricepricefpriceStrikepremiumPut
0
)(*)(_     (6) 
This condition directly follows from the description of I’s strategy (5), and condition (4). 
B) The individual rationality constraint for firm type B coincides with the incentive 
compatibility constraint for firm type B, and both reduce to the following inequality:  
∫ −<
Strike
B dpricepricefpriceStrikepremiumPut
0
)(*)(_     (7) 
Similar to A) this condition directly follows from the description of I’s strategy (5), and 
condition (4). 
The strategy of the intermediary to propose a take it or leave it offer to buy put 
options for a premium equal to the expression in (5) assures that only firms of type A will 
agree to sell options to intermediary. Firms of type A have positive private information 
about their future performance. The true value of the put options computed using their 
private information is lower than the premium proposed by I. Therefore, firms of type A 
will accept the proposal by the intermediary and earn positive profits. On the other hand, 
firms of type B have private information that their performance will be less than average. 
The value of the put option computed using their private information will be higher than 
the premium proposed by I and all firms of type B will not accept the terms of the 
financial intermediary. As a consequence, the separating equilibrium of the game exists 
and it is unique. When the intermediary sees that a firm accepts its terms, the 
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intermediary can immediately update its beliefs that this firm is a firm of type A, and later 
use this information to earn profits trading in other options of the same firm.  
Numerical Example 
To illustrate the screening model we developed above we provide the following 
numerical example. The example uses a binomial option-pricing model to show the value 
of information about future price changes of the stocks of the two firms.8 Suppose there 
are only two future states of nature, a good and a bad state. Let type A firms have a 
payoff of 120 in the good state and a payoff of 60 in the bad state. Type B firms have a 
payoff of 100 in the good state and a payoff of 40 in the bad state. If we assume for 
simplicity that there is an equal number of firms of both types, then the expected payoff 
of a firm of unknown type is 110 in the good state and 50 in the bad state. Let the stock 
price of the average firm to be 80, and the rate on T-bills (the risk-free security) to be 5%.  
Now, I offers to each firm to buy put options with a strike of 65. The payoff of 
this put option given the public information is 0 is the good state and 15 in the bad state. 
The put option price computed using only public information is then $6.19.9 Both firms 
know their type and therefore they know for sure the true value of the put option for 
them. The value of the put for firm type A is $2.86, while the value of the put for firm 
type B is $6.35. As a result, only firms of type A will agree to sell put options and the 
                                                 
8 See Lo and Wang (1995) for a sophisticated option pricing model that incorporates information about 
future returns.  
9 See, for example, page 662 of Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1999) for an exposition how to price options 
using the binomial pricing model 
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intermediary will lose on this trade $3.49 per option. After the losing trade, the 
intermediary learns what firms are type A, and what firms are type B. After acquiring this 
private information that the rest of the market does not have, the intermediary buys a call 
option with a strike of 100, written on the stock of a type A firm. The true value of this 
call option is $7.62, while the intermediary can buy it from an uninformed investor for 
only $5.40 (the fair price given public information). The intermediary makes a profit of 
$2.22 per option. In order to make positive profits from the whole transaction, the 
intermediary needs to make sure that it buys at least 1.57 times more call options from 
the market than the number of put options that it bought from the issuing firms. For 
example if the intermediary proposes to buy 100 put option contracts (10,000 options) 
from one firms, and the firm agrees. Then, the intermediary can buy 200 call option 
contracts from the market, and make a total profit of: 
20,000*2.22-10,000*3.49 = $9500 
The financial intermediary can continue buying additional call options until the 
rest of the market participants detect the abnormal trading, and update their information 
about firm type. At this point the call option price will rise to its fair value of $7.62, and 
the informational rents for the financial intermediary will disappear. 
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Figure 1. Extensive Form of the Game Played by the Financial Intermediary and the Firms Repurchasing Stocks 
The description of the information, players and payoffs is in the Appendix. From inequality (4) and equation (5) follows that PA1>0, and PB1<0. This 
ensures that firms of type B will always disagree, while firms of type A will always agree to sell put options to the financial intermediary. Because this 
separating equilibrium is unique, the intermediary acquires private information about firm type, and then the payoffs for the intermediary that matter PI1, 
PI7 are both greater than 0. 
0. Nature picks type A or B 
1. Intermediary offers to buy 
Puts 
2. Firms decide to agree or 
not 
3. Intermediary decides 
whether to trade on 
Information 
A B 
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Put Option Issuers from Trading Day –60 to +60 Relative to First 
Put Option Sale 
 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns are computed using the market model. We compute CARs using a market model. The market model parameters 
are estimated using a window from 180 days to 61 days before the event date, which is the day of the put option sale. We use the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio as our proxy for the market. We include only the 17 firms that disclose the exact date when they sold put options for the first time. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of the Put Option Contracts 
 
IB with ID denotes cases where the exact identity of an investment bank is reported as a buyer. IB no ID denotes cases where the firms only state that the buyer is 
an investment bank. Only nine of the 53 firms report the exact date on which they have sold put options for the first time. Based on references to option 
expiration in other 10-K forms, we are able to infer an exact date for an additional eight firms. 11 firms report only the month when they sold put options, and we 
infer the month for an additional 16 firms. In order to compute the number of days till disclosure we assume in these cases that the date is in the middle of the 
month. Four firms report only the quarter. For these firms we assume that the date is the middle of the quarter. The remaining five firms report only the year 
when they first issued put options and we report these as N/A. 
 
 
Option Type Buyer Type Option Maturity Days till Disclosure Option Outcome 
# of companies # of companies # of companies days # of companies
 
European 
  
32  
 
IB with ID 
 
5 
 
Below six months 
 
13 
 
Average 
 
186
 
Expired 
 
32 
 
American 
  
11  
 
IB no ID 
 
1 
 
Between six month and one year 
 
13 
 
Median 
 
99
 
Settled  
 
6 
 
Both A & E 
  
1  
 
Financial Intermediary 
 
1 
 
One year 
 
9 
 
Minimum 
 
(5)
 
Some Exercised  
 
8 
 
Exotic 
  
1  
 
Independent third party 
 
14 
 
Greater than one year 
 
11 
 
Maximum 
 
1,561
 
All Exercised  
 
2 
 
N/A 
  
8  
 
Private placement 
 
16 
 
N/A 
 
7 
 
N/A 
 
5
 
N/A  
 
5 
   
N/A 
 
14   
 
   
   
   
Open market 
 
1 
   
   
   
    
 
Investment Trust 
 
1 
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Table 2: 
Earnings Before Interest & Taxes (EBIT) and the t-values for comparison within and 
between the SRP set and matching samples 
 
Average (Earnings Before Interest & Taxes) is the mean of corresponding annual Earnings Before 
Interest & Taxes for parallel relative year for particular set; RY is year relative to the year the firm sold put 
options for the first time; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison set of  122 industry-and-
size-matched firms with stock repurchase program; (The number of control firms is less than 159 because 
several of the synthetic repurchase firms share matched firms as they fall in the same 4-digit SIC industry 
and are very similar in size); Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison set of 122 industry-
and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-value for the parallel 
relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the computed p-value for the 
relative years – 5 and 5 for corresponding set; p-value (-5,0) is the computed p-value for the relative years 
– 5 and 0 for corresponding set; p-value (0,5) is the computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for 
corresponding set. 
 
RY Average (EBIT) Difference Between Portfolios
  Put Issuing Firms 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Put Issuing Firms
& Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
Put Issuing Firms 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
-5 $164  $158 $92 $5 $72 $66 
-4 $217  $181 $91 $35 $126 ** $90* 
-3 $249  $198 $116 $51 $134 ** $82 
-2 $298  $214 $128 $85 $171 ** $86 
-1 $381  $218 $127 $163** $255 *** $91* 
 $471  $235 $128 $236*** $343 *** $107* 
1 $539  $214 $88 $325*** $451 *** $126** 
2 $641  $222 $44 $419*** $597 *** $178***
3 $942  $214 $68 $727*** $874 *** $146** 
4 $1,350  $317 $102 $1,033*** $1,247 *** $214** 
5 $1,358  $361 $81 $997** $1,277 ** $280** 
         
 (-5,5) $1,194 *** $202** -$11       
 (-5,0) $307 ** $77 $36 Test of Equality of Averages Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $887 ** $125  -$48         
 xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
  
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very similar results. 
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Table 3 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns after the Put Option Sale 
 
CAR denotes Cumulative Abnormal Returns. We compute CARs using a market model. The market model 
parameters are estimated using a window from 180 days to 61 days before the event date, which is the day 
of the put option sale. We use the CRSP value-weighted portfolio as our proxy for the market.  We include 
only the 17 firms that disclose the exact date when they sold put options for the first time. We report CARs 
for five different event windows: from 60 days to one day before the put option sale i.e. (-60, -1); from the 
day of the sale to one day after (0, 1); from the day of the sale to two days after (0, 2); from the day of the 
sale to three days after (0, 3); and from day 0 to 60 days after (0, 60). P-value for the t-test that the average 
CAR equal zero and a Wilcoxon Rank test for the median are in parenthesis. % Positive (Negative) is the 
percentage of firms with positive (negative) CARs during the corresponding event window. 
 
      
 
Event Window Average CAR % Median CAR % % Negative % Positive
      
(-60,-1) -10.522 -10.74 70.6 29.4
                 (0.044) (0.028)
 
(0,1) 0.235 1.136 29.4 70.6
                 (0.810) (0.246)
 
(0,2) 2.135 2.747 29.4 70.6
                 (0.056) (0.025)
 
(0,3) 1.628 1.715 29.4 70.6
                 (0.213) (0.096)
 
(0,60) 10.422 4.04 29.4 70.6
                  (0.112) (0.038)   
 
 
 
